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Abstract 
An insatiable thirst for oil has led poorly coordinated, risk~prone megasystems deeper 
into the ocean in search of new oil reserves. Profit-driven agendas at the corporate level 
have a top-down effect within these megasystems. Cost-cutting and risk-downplaying 
leaves the field employees unprepared to handle emergencies. A series of costly mistakes 
led to the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, which caused extensive damage to an 
already fragile ecosystem in the Gulf of Mexico. The wealth and political influence of 
the oil industry overpowers lax regulatory agencies and legislation- even though media 
and research has exposed frustrating parallels between the Deepwater Horizon spill and 
previous spills in terms of causation and impaired response capabilities. The need to 
improve enviromnental review and legislation is apparent. Effective emergency response 
requires better coordination of collaborative assessment and restoration efforts, and 
honest, objective communication between all parties involved. Restoration should tal(e 
the entire ecosystem and its surrounding communities into consideration. Accurate 
monetary valuations of nature are impossible, and the best method of preservation is 
prevention. 
Introduction 
Energy demands have created a worldwide dependency on oil. Over three billion 
gallons are used daily worldwide, 700 million of which are used by the United States 
(Congressional Digest 201 Oa). Widespread use and continuous transportation of oil make 
it nearly inevitable that some spillage will occur. Spills in rivers, bays and ocean basins 
are typically caused by accidents involving tankers, barges, pipelines, refineries and 
storage facilities, usually during transportation (Congressional Digest 201 Oa). High 
likelihood of spills has led to a demand for prevention and management strategies, which 
are prepared using extensive research on the causes of spills, and the resources and 
personnel necessary to clean them. 
Oil spills can be caused by mistakes or carelessness, faulty or damaged 
equipment, natural disasters, or deliberate acts by terrorists, countries at war, vandals or 
illegal dumpers (Congressional Digest 2010a). In any case, spills of any size typically 
initiate a response from local, State and Federal govermnent agencies, and numerous 
volunteer organizations. In the United States, the U.S. Coast Guard or the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) usually take charge of response, and organizations such as 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the Fish and Wildlife 
Service are contacted for help and information (Congressional Digest 201 Oa ). Severe 
penalties against companies at fault and safety regulations on vessel design have been 
implemented as prevention strategies (Congressional Digest 2010a). 
Oil floats on salt water and freshwater; rarely, very heavy oil sinks in freshwater. 
A thin layer of oil, referred to as an oil slick, is formed as the floating oil spreads rapidly 
across water surfaces. As oil spreads further by wind and water currents, the oil thins to a 
sheen, which often looks like a rainbow (Congressional Digest 2010a). Surface oil on 
water, marshes and beaches is visible, which helps facilitate removal. Detection of oil in 
deeper waters or in sediments requires highly specialized instruments, due to physical 
and chemical changes of the oil that take place after it sinks (Unified Area Command 
2010). Oil can become sticky and coalesce with particles that make it heavy enough to 
sink, most often in nearshore areas where loose sand is abundant. When not combined 
with heavy particles, dispersed subsurface oil droplets typically degrade and diffuse to 
concentrations that are too low for removal (Restore the Gulf2010a 2010). 
Location and timing have a huge impact on immediate effects of an oil spill on 
local flora and fauna. Seasonal and daily variations in distribution and behavior 
determine whether an organism is present at the time of a spill. A species' vulnerability 
to spilled oil also determines the degree of impact of a spill (Restore the Gulf 20 I Oa 
2010). Contact with spilled oil can be especially harmful to marine birds and mammals, 
fish, and shellfish, especially organisms in early developmental phases. Oil reduces the 
insulating property of fur on mammals, and the water-repelling ability of bird feathers 
(Congressional Digest 201 Oa). Without insulating mechanisms, exposure to cold can 
lead to hypothermia and/or death, and ingestion of the oil (e.g., from birds preening to 
clean their feathers) can cause illness or death. Marine mammals that surface to breathe 
can experience eye or skin irritation from the oil, and/or breathe in harmful fumes. Fur-
bearing marine mannnals and feathered sea birds are more vulnerable to the impacts of 
oil than mammals that have blubber for insulation. Oil sinking in the water column can 
hurt or kill fish and plankton, especially drifters and weak swimmers (Restore the Gulf 
201 Oa 201 0). Wind and water currents push oil onshore, leaving gobs of oil along the 
beach, and smothering burrowed organisms (NOAA 2006). The toxicity and 
concentration of the spill determines the extent of harm that organisms experience, but 
even non-lethal exposure to oil can hinder reproduction, alter development, impair 
feeding mechanisms, and decrease immune responses of marine life (Congressional 
Digest 2010b). 
The best clean-up method to use after an oil spill depends on weather conditions, 
amount of oil spilled, the distance from the shore, proximity and size of local human 
populations, and habitat types of native animals. Methods include booms, floating 
barriers to stop oil leaks by collecting oil, and "skimmer" boats that skim spilled oil from 
the surface. Extra-large sponges known as sorbents absorb oil directly, and chemical 
dispersants or biological agents can be used to break down oil into its chemical 
constituents. Freshly spilled oil floating on the water surface can be burned (in-situ 
burning) and oil on beaches can be washed off with low- or high-pressure hoses, or 
vacuumed by vacuum trucks (Congressional Digest 2010a). 
NOAA's Office of Response and Restoration is the primary government agency 
overseeing restoration efforts. The agency acts to protect coastal and marine resources by 
moderating threats, reducing harm, and restoring ecological function of environments 
damaged by oil spills and other disasters. NOAA incorporates real-time data and regular 
briefings from satellites, aircrafts, ships, and buoys as well as physical samples in 
emergency response and long-term restoration plans (NOAA 201 0). In-depth studies and 
analyses of effects on organisms at small and large scales are used comprehensively. 
Data include information on salinity, temperature, and pressure in affected water 
columns, as well as sediment samples and fluorometer readings. 
The Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) follows the initial EPA and 
Coast Guard cleanup, and involves a three-step evaluation to determine impacts of 
hazardous-substance release such as oil spills. A Preliminary Assessment uses time-
sensitive data, scientific literature and mathematical models to determine enviromnental 
injury, and its severity. Injury Assessment and Restoration Planning quantifies 
environmental damage and identifies possible restoration projects using economic and 
scientific studies. After evaluation, the Restoration Phase implements these projects and 
monitors their progress and effectiveness (NOAA 201 0). 
The Deepwater BP Oil Spill - caused by an explosion and subsequent fire of a 
deepwater drilling platform -leaked roughly 700,000 gallons of oil into the Gulf of 
Mexico, and killed II men (Congressional Digest 20 I Oa). In the years prior to the 
Deepwater disaster, legislation regarding oil spills has been demanded and implemented 
to further develop prevention and management strategies. These acts focus on industry 
liability, and require safeguard and response plans. 
After the BP Deepwater Horizon spill, NOAA invited a public response for 
restoration ideas and projects. Additionally, after analysis and quality check, pre-
assessment scientific data from the NRDA was posted publicly. Pre-assessment data are 
rarely released, but high public interest in this spill, and the need to consider all potential 
restoration methods, encouraged the public release. Restoration planning should be a 
comprehensive collaboration of government agencies, volunteer organizations, and the 
general public (NOAA 2010). 
The practices and regulation of oil-drilling companies are often subjects of 
concern for researchers, environmental enthusiasts, the media, and general public. The 
general and scientific public has questioned gaps in knowledge of the hazards of 
exposure to crude oil. Conflicting research on oil drilling practices and spill effects is 
often released or reported in the media, and at times misrepresented. Perhaps most 
importantly, risky, cost-cutting and image building practices are widespread throughout 
the oil industry. The consistency and completeness of information provided by the 
government, drilling companies, scientific research, and media coverage of oil spills, all 
of which influence legislation, has yet to be determined. 
Investigation 
To examine the consistency of data released regarding the Deepwater Horizon 
spill, I compared information collected from scientific papers, government information 
databases, press releases, and news articles regarding oil spill assessment and restoration. 
These sources focus primarily on the Deepwater Horizon incident, and also include 
studies of previous spills and media. The complexity of interactions within an ecosystem 
and consequent impacts of spilled oil, combined with strong economic, political and 
social influences make restoration a long and controversial process. Government 
agencies, oil companies, scientific research, and media coverage are all interconnected, 
but have conflicting interests in matters of energy demand. First, a comprehensive 
overview of the effects, responses, and preconditions of the Deepwater spill is given, 
followed by a discussion of gaps in knowledge, damage report inconsistencies and 
conflicts of interest between the oil industry, government, media and researchers. 
Damages to an already fragile ecosystem 
The Gulf of Mexico lies in a transition zone between temperate and tropical 
waters, an ecosystem that supports exceptionally high marine biodiversity (Campagna 
2011). An ecosystem is a complex system formed by organisms and their environment, 
including interactions between the organisms, and biotic and abiotic factors. Ecosystems 
provide value far beyond their individual resources. Ecosystems include structural 
components, such as marsh flora and the composition of soil layers, as well as dynamic 
processes, such as nutrient cycling, water filtration, and life cycles of organisms 
(Kornfeld 2011). None of these components function independently, and interference at 
one level can have rippling effects that are magnified throughout the ecosystem. 
Unfortunately, the Deepwater Horizon spill had damaging effects for species 
already considered vulnerable. In the Gulf of Mexico, the U.S. Endangered Species Act, 
Marine Mammal Protection Act, and Migratory Bird Treaty Act protect a limited number 
of marine species; however, many species are considered threatened by other 
organizations, but remain unprotected by federal law (Campagna 2011). The 
International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) lists forty threatened but 
unprotected species that occur in the Gulf on their Red List of Threatened Species. The 
Red List is a highly respected international system that uses a rigorous scientific process 
to assess relative, global extinction risk at the species level (Campagna 2011 ). Marine 
species in particular may be underrepresented by the U.S. ESA; therefore, environmental 
impact assessments regarding offshore drilling in the Gulf of Mexico should include 
available data on globally threatened species (Campagna 2011). 
Information from the IUCN Red List helps coordinate conservation priorities for 
migratory and trans boundary species (Campagna 2011). Around 75-90% of organisms in 
the northern Gulf of Mexico spend part or all of their lives in estuarine waters 
surrounding Louisiana's vast wetlands. Oysters and bay anchovies are permanent 
residents of these estuaries, whereas other species move out to sea to spawn and complete 
their life cycles (Mascarelli 2010). Bluefin tuna in the Gulf have a peak spawning period 
from mid-April to June, during the timeframe of the 2010 BP oil spill (Campagna 2011). 
Seagrasses provide structural habitat, food and nursery grounds for recreationally 
and commercially important fish, invertebrates, mammals, reptiles, and waterfowl. Some 
seagrasses, as indicated by their names (e.g., turtle grass and manatee grass) are primary 
food sources for already threatened species. Damages from oil exposure place stress on 
species that are directly dependent on these plants the higher trophic levels that 
herbivores support (Campagna 2011). The Kemp's Ridley sea turtle is the rarest sea 
turtle in the world, and nests exclusively in the Gulf of Mexico. This species is listed as 
critically endangered on the IUCN Red List and is protected by the ESA. The Deepwater 
Horizon spill coincided with this species' key reproductive period. The species was on 
its way to recovery after a population collapse several decades ago, but the vast majority 
of sea turtles found dead since the spill were Kemp's Ridleys (Campagna 2011). Sea 
turtles do not breed annually and do not reach maturity until after 12 to 20 years of age, 
so the effects of the spill on future generations of sea turtles will not be apparent for years 
(Safina 2011 ). 
The Florida manatee, a subspecies of the endangered West Indian manatee, is 
found in the Gulf and around the Florida coastline. This species suffered a 1 0% 
population loss during the winter of 2009-2010 due to record-breaking low temperatures. 
The West Indian manatee already faces population pressures from habitat loss, increased 
boating activity, and fishing gear entanglement. Surface oil from the spill may cause skin 
and eye irritation to manatees as they emerge to breathe. The marine mannnal could also 
ingest oil-covered seagrasses, or experience toxic effects from chemical oil dispersants 
(Campagna 2011). 
Dispersed oil in the water column may harm organisms at the lowest trophic 
levels, which may result in greater damages to the long-term health of an ecosystem. The 
BP Deepwater Horizon spill occurred during maximum larval production of fish, 
shellfish and small life-forms that maintain the productiveness of the Gulf (Plater 2011 ). 
The billions of larva and plankton that drifted in the contaminated water column may 
have died from oil exposure or poisoned other organisms that ingested them (Plater 
2011 ). 
Researchers feared Louisiana wetlands would be damaged. The extent of damage 
is determined by how deep hydrocarbons from the oil penetrated into sediments. If 
chemicals prove toxic to wetland root systems, erosion and subsidence would accelerate, 
damaging important offshore nursery grounds (Mascarelli 2010). Long-term effects of 
the oil spill on organisms and habitats in the Gulf and on the coast remain to be seen, and 
depend on the concentration of oil, how far it has travelled, and exposure time - most of 
which are unknown (Mascarelli 201 0). 
Health hazards: gaps in research 
Although further research is still necessary to determine long-term environmental 
damages, researchers know surprisingly little about the hazards of human exposure to 
crude oil. Even though at least I 0 percent of all oil tanker spills between 1970 and 2009 
have affected coastal populations, there has been little research on the long-term health 
effects from oil spills (Sandler et al. 2011). Scientists have a better understanding of the 
vulnerability of sea bird and marshlands to oil than that of humans (Woodward 20 I 0). 
Crude oil is a combination of various chemical compounds, composed mainly of 
polycyclic aromatic hyrdrocarbons (P AHs) (Meo 2009). Health hazards from exposure 
to crude oil spillage include symptoms such as shortness of breath, cough, runny nose, 
asthmatic attacks, redness of eyes, nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, headaches and 
dizziness (Meo 2009). Respiratory problems, skin irritation, and heat stress were 
common in workers involved in the cleanup ofthe spill. The National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health reported that oil is an irritant of skin and lungs, but is 
"unlikely" to damage health in the long term (Woodward 2010). However, impaired lung 
function caused by air pollution due to crude oil spills is a function ofthe duration of 
exposure to the contaminants (Meo 2009). 
In order carry out an effective, comparative health study, it is critical to identify 
workers who may have been exposed to oil, collect exposure and medical histories as 
early as possible, and conduct detailed exposure assessments. These processes are often 
overlooked during the urgency of immediate response efforts, which is why studies of 
exposure assessment in the Deepwater Horizon spill are largely retrospective. Gathering 
the exposure and medical histories of workers as early as possible, preferably before any 
work-related symptoms appear, can identify an appropriately unexposed comparison 
group. A broad range of health issues should be considered. Health outcomes by 
exposure duration among workers can be used to identify immediate health service needs 
and the relationship between oil exposure and work practices. This information, as well 
as information on the use and effectiveness of protective equipment and worker safety 
training, can be used to modify future spill cleanup techniques to minimize exposure 
(Savitz and Engel 201 0). 
The Deepwater Horizon spill had negative psychological consequences for the 
people directly and indirectly affected by it. Psychological impacts of the spill resulted 
from uncertainty over ecological effects and consequent future viability of fishing and 
tourism (Safina 2011 ). Louisiana state counseling teams reported that grounded 
fishermen, affected industry employees and business owners, as well as residents close to 
the crisis exhibited signs of acute anxiety, depression, excessive drinking, and some 
suicidal ideation (Woodward 2010). A study was conducted to determine the level of 
distress and mechanisms of adjustment for communities indirectly impacted by or 
directly exposed to the oil spill. No significant differences were found between groups in 
terms of distress, adjustment, or environmental worry, but residents of both communities 
displayed clinically significant depression and anxiety. Residents who suffered spill-
related income loss showed more depression and less resilience, and were more likely to 
use behavioral disengagement as a coping mechanism (Grattan 2011 ). 
Seafood contamination was a major concern after the BP oil spill. Fishing bans 
were initiated by NOAA in 36% of federal waters in the Gulf (nearly 87,000 square 
miles) at the height of the spill (Issues in Science & Technology 2010). Concentrations 
of chemicals related to the spill were tested in seafood and compared to data from 
previous oil spills. Risk assessment of health impacts from P AH exposure and metal 
contamination were used to evaluate seafood safety before reopening fisheries. Chemical 
test results indicated low P AH levels in contrast to previous oil spills, and low levels of 
concern were determined, even under conservative risk parameters (Gohlke 2011). 
Fisheries began to reopen as early as late summer in 2010, but consumer doubt regarding 
effects of oil on fish and shellfish remained, despite the government's claims of safety 
(Uhlmann 2011). Long-term spill effects of the spill on spawning grounds and 
reproductive capacities are uncertain (Uhlmann 2011). Florida State University 
researchers testified that the spill could reduce population sizes of edible marine species, 
and could decrease ecosystem productivity by up to 10 to 15% in the Gulf; tuna, shrimp, 
fiddler crabs, and clams are likely to be the most affected (Issues in Science & 
Technology 201 0). 
The Macondo well and blowout 
The Macondo well was leased by multinational energy company British 
Petroleum (BP) Exploration and Production, Inc. in 2008. The plot of seafloor in the 
Gulf of Mexico where the well was located is roughly 70km from the southern shore of 
Louisiana. The drilling company Transocean was hired in 2009, but a hurricane delayed 
drilling and damaged the rig. Deepwater Horizon rig replaced the original rig, and 
drilling the well began in February 2010 (Safina 2011, Uhlmann 2011). The drilling 
platform was bigger than a football field, and the drill itself was nearly 122m long (Safina 
2011). Drilling rigs are meant to discover, not extract. Various problems set the project 
behind schedule and over budget, but the rig was prepared to close in April 2010 after a 
commercially valuable oil reservoir was discovered (Safina 2011, Uhlmann 2011). 
Oil found below deepwater is under tremendous pressure, and pressure control 
consequently tops the priority list of concerns in drilling procedures. Drilling mud, 
which is a special, heavy fluid, is injected through the drillpipe to prevent pressurized oil 
and gas from surging through the well. Drilling mud is replaced by a brine solution to 
maintain well control once the well is completed (Latham 2011 ). However, pressurized 
drilling fluid escaped through the porosity of the Macondo well's loose walls. A special 
viscous fluid was used as a sealing mixture, but engineers mixed more than needed, 
creating an expensive and tedious waste-disposal problem. Drilling rules allowed the 
viscous fluid to be mixed with other drilling fluids and sent down the well, instead of 
sending the hazardous waste to land for disposal. Unfortunately, the viscous fluid 
clogged a key pressure gauge, and the gauge showed a zero-pressure reading. 
A pressure gauge on a different line showed building pressure, indicating a 
cement plug failed to seal pressurized hydrocarbons in the well. Rig crew members 
convinced themselves the gauge showing zero-pressure was correct, and the other reading 
was an anomaly (Safina 2010). Workers were unaware that gas was escaping from the 
well, which led to an explosion and two-day fire; and the rig eventually sank into the 
nearly mile-deep water. By the time a problem was realized, confusion and issues over 
authority delayed assessment of severity, and caused hesitation in initiating attempts to 
disconnect the rig from the mile-long pipe (Safina 2011, Uhlmann 2011). In the event 
that drilling mud or cement fails to control well pressure, the most critical piece of 
emergency response technology is the blowout preventer. However, the reliance of the 
oil-drilling industry on blowout preventers has been proven dangerous, and this costly 
mistake directly contributed to the magnitude of the Deepwater Horizon spill (Latham 
2011). 
Response Failures 
In the aftermath of the explosion, many ofBP's attempts to seal the leak failed; 
meanwhile, cleanup crews attempted to collect or disperse the oil using mechanical 
surface-cleaning methods before it reached the Gulf Coast. An oil slick nearly 29,000 
square miles formed in the Gulf (Uhlmann 2011 ). BP had a federally approved spill 
response plan for the Gulf of Mexico that included major sections merely cut-and-pasted 
from Arctic spill response plans. The approval process overlooked the fact that the plan 
explained what it would do for walruses and sea lions, creatures that do not inhabit the 
Gulf of Mexico. In a region filled with oil rigs and hardware, a device to shut off a mile-
deep leaking pipe was nowhere to be found. Dispersant chemicals and response 
paraphernalia adequate to contain small spills were the only response equipment 
available (Safina 2010). 
In order to limit damage from oil spills and facilitate containment and cleanup 
efforts, timely information on spill location, size and extent must be obtained. Direction 
and speed of oil movement, and wind, current, and wave information are critical to 
predict oil drift and dispersion. Fast turn-around time and frequent imaging of the site are 
necessary to monitor spill dynamics (Klemas 201 0). The inability to accurately estimate 
the amount of oil gushing from the broken pipe at a depth of one mile was a critical spill 
response fault in this incident. Estimates of spillage obtained by BP, the Coast Guard and 
research organizations ranged from 200,000 to several million gallons per day. By the 
middle of June, thousands of vessels and tens of thousands of personnel were involved in 
cleanup efforts (Klemas 20 I 0). 
Oil spill preconditions 
The BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico is often listed as the worst enviromnental 
disaster in U.S. history; however, the incident was not without precedent (Uhlmann 
2011). The Deepwater Horizon spill was not the first time a blowout preventer failed to 
avoid a catastrophic flow of oil after pressure-control was lost (Latham 20 II). Hard 
systemic lessons learned from previous oil spills had been largely forgotten or diluted in 
subsequent years, and there are frustrating parallels between the Deepwater Horizon spill 
and previous spills in terms of causation and impaired response capability (Plater 2011). 
Preconditions for catastrophes lie latent within the processes of planning, 
permitting, constructing and operating oil-drilling systems, and in designing inadequate 
precautionary safeguards (Plater 2011 ). The 1990 Alaska Commission noted that the 
Exxon-Valdez drilling system was developed using shortcuts and with a primary focus on 
production rather than safety. Regulatory agencies often accepted industry data and 
assurances uncritically, and a lack of system safeguards was overlooked as permits were 
issued without required documentation (Plater 2011 ). 
These regulatory problems were compounded by a series of internal shortcuts and 
mistakes that ultimately led to the Deepwater Horizon blowout. At the scene of the 
disaster, the mistakes began with the bond cement test that BP cancelled that might have 
revealed problems with the cement seal. The drilling mud, which helps the cement cure, 
was not circulated adequately; and the drilling mud was even diluted with seawater, 
which accounted for the porosity through which the gas escaped (Uhlmarm 2011). The 
pressure tests conducted hours before the blowout should have revealed the instability of 
the cement seal; but rig workers failed to correctly interpret pressure-gauge disparities 
and overlooked warning signs at a critical time. They were able to convince themselves 
the clogged zero-pressure reading was the correct one, even though the possibility of 
building pressure should require a response of the utmost precaution (Safina 2010). 
Hesitation over authority prevented emergency-response action from being taken, 
possibly because individuals within an organization at times sacrifice sound judgment to 
avoid questioning the majority (Flournoy 20 II). 
The system of oil production and transport is a complex, multi -corporation, multi-
agency megasystem, exponentially multiplying risks and the potential for catastrophe 
(Plater 2011). The Minerals Management Service (MMS) is the Interior Department 
agency responsible for overseeing drilling safety. The effectiveness and reliability of 
blowout preventers has been a concern ofMMS for over a decade, and studies even 
showed 117 failures at 83 deepwater wells (Latham 2011 ). The need to improve and 
enhance environmental protection of deepwater drilling was also addressed by MMS 
years before the Deepwater Horizon spill occurred. It took more than 1400 incidents, 
forty-one fatalities, and ten instances of lost pressure-control, in addition to the 
Deepwater Horizon disaster, for a rule that furthered deepwater drilling and 
environmental safety regulations to be published (Latham 2011 ). 
Industry shortcomings 
The Gulf oil spill exposed significant regulatory shortcomings within the MMS. 
(Uhlmann 2011). In the years leading up to the Deepwater Horizon incident, the 
organization lacked funding, personnel, and the technical expertise necessary to develop 
adequate safety regulations. MMS lacked staff to perform meaningful inspections, which 
involved only limited review of drilling activities. Regulations are based heavily on data 
provided by oil companies, and inspections were infrequent, rarely unarmounced, and 
consisted almost entirely of verifying paperwork (Flournoy 2011, Uhlmann 2011). These 
outdated authorizing statutes fail to protect and talce adequate account of human health, 
safety and the environment. 
The Deepwater Horizon Environmental Impact Statement prepared by the MMS 
did not address a blowout scenario or worst-case analysis- even though the MMS had 
previously questioned the reliability of blowout preventers. Several entities reviewed the 
EIS, but none raised an alarm about the possibility of an uncontrolled blowout. The 
agency's procedures for environmental review fail to provide an effective framework for 
analyzing oil exploration and drilling risks, and modest penalty provisions fail to deter 
risky conduct or emphasize the seriousness of violations and threats to human health and 
the environment (Flournoy 2011, Uhlmann 2011). Although the MMS was given charge 
of regulating an extremely sophisticated industry, in which technology increased the 
complexity of monitoring necessary for effective regulation, its budget remained 
relatively flat (Flournoy 20 ll ). 
The general success of previous problem-solving techniques contributes to their 
legitimacy - which provides reinforcement for veteran employees, and newer employees 
are taught how to perceive problems the organization frequently encounters (Kurtz 20 l 0). 
Hindsight bias often inclines those seeking to learn from past mistakes to be overly 
confident that they can avoid the same error, and during emergency preparations, safety 
lessons from past drilling incidents were offhandedly accepted as already learned 
(Flournoy 2011). Warning signs were missed, and by the time anyone realized a blowout 
was occurring, it was too late (Uhlmann 2011 ). The Deepwater Horizon blowout made it 
apparent that disasters caused by humans are not merely a result of technical problems, 
but an internal set of decision-malcing norms that hinder effective reflection, adaptive 
learning, and innovation (Flournoy 2011, Kurtz 2010). 
Cost-cutting and risk downplaying 
Current domestic oil recovery and output fails to meet an ever-increasing demand, 
and petroleum engineers continue to delve progressively deeper in search of new supplies 
of recoverable oil. Tapping deepwater-oil deposits involves increasingly sophisticated 
technology to locate potential oil reserves thousands of feet under the ocean's surface, 
and equally advanced technology to then extract the oil from thousands of feet beneath 
the ocean floor (Latham 2011). In just the past decade, the number of wells has jumped 
from only two dozen to nearly 300 (Safina 2011). Inherent with increasing size, 
complexity, and technical sophistication of the elements of a megasystem is increased 
risk of a mega-catastrophe- and greater need for extreme vigilance in design, 
coordination, and operation (Plater 2011). In spite of this, the bigger these megasystems 
become, the more difficult it is for corporate managers and government agencies to keep 
track of and manage the cumulative mass of critical points of risk. Likewise, the growth 
of megasystems is matched by increasing daily internal economic and political pressures 
to maximize short-term benefits, and consequently, a tendency downplay risks (Plater 
2011, Safina 2011). 
Despite high-risk locations, huge technological challenges and high-risk potentials, 
internal management strategies are often driven by short-term economic gains and 
managed in business terms, rather than in the interest of safety. Cost -cutting practices 
and under-vigilant regulatory agencies are driven by profits, politics and an ever-
increasing demand for oil supplies. Shareholder and managerial expectations of high 
revenues take priority over public concern for human and environmental safety, but 
industry executives are skilled at creating a safety-first image both internally and 
externally (Plater 2011 ). 
BP's corporate leadership flaunted an environmentally-friendly image. The 
corporate banner British Petroleum was replaced by BP, a logo representative of a vision 
looking "beyond petroleum." A focus on alternative energy, dedication to environmental 
protection, and safety-first practices were all stated components of the new BP. The 
image assured stakeholders that the company was a different from other energy 
corporations, and the company strove to convey an image of integrity. Authority figures 
claimed they viewed every employee concern as an opportunity for action and continuous 
improvement. This declaration, and the conveyed image of integrity, conflicted with 
testimonies from U.S. Senators, citizen oversight groups, BP field employees and 
independent analysts. These reports painted a picture of a profit-first culture, and 
leadership that regularly ignored safety concerns and engaged in excessive operational 
risk taking (Kurtz 2010). 
The deterioration of integrity was a top-down process, enforced by authority figures 
within the company. Symbolic stories, icons, and image-building- not substantive 
actions- were used by BP's leadership to maintain an external image for stakeholders, 
and internal misconduct. Stories of management threats, coercion and job-loss deterred 
"whistleblowers" within the company, and veteran field staff and new employees learned 
to overlook environmental compliance and safety infractions. At higher levels in the 
organization, managers who exceeded production and profit targets were rewarded with 
bonuses averaging 120 to 150 percent of their base salaries (Kurtz 2010). 
Damage assessment inconsistencies 
In the aftermath of the oil spill, reports regarding long-term ecological effects 
varied widely. The extent of environmental harm may not be known for many years, 
because such a large amount of oil has never before been spilled from an offshore well 
(Uhlmann 2011). Legal liability is relative to how much of the spilled oil enters the 
environment. This gives oil companies a strong incentive to minimize or hide the amount 
of oil spilled (Safina 2011 ). 
After the spill, two storylines unfolded. The first story, as told by media and 
researchers in an attempt to downplay the damage, played along the lines of oil-
consuming microbes clearing any oil not siphoned from the well, burned or skimmed at 
surface, or chemically dispersed. Other research and news articles, determined to expose 
the oil industry, told of marine life being smothered and poisoned by largely unseen oil, 
and one study even reported a vast plume of oil on the floor of the Gulf (Nash 2011, 
Uhlmann 2011). Interlaced factual, emotional and political aspects of the incident shaped 
the damage reports (Safina 2011 ). 
Oil production and transportation are governed by public and private societal 
governing structures, comprised of two theoretically counter-balancing divisions (Plater 
2011). Administration driven by industry, market, and profit has a primary focus of 
generating jobs, technology, wealth and political power. In contrast, state and federal 
regulatory agencies must monitor the industry and protect the public from industry's 
market failure. The industry and agency players form a combined culture of 
complacency, collusion, and neglect (Plater 2011). The resulting oil megasystems are 
poorly coordinated and risk-prone, incapable of ensuring human or ecological safety. 
Internal corporate culture is likely controlled by the dominant partner's corporate agenda 
and policy. To make matters worse, industries have the right to hold company 
information confidential, even when the data are of critical public importance (Plater 
2011). 
Witholding information protects the image of the oil industry. For example, the 
chemical components of dispersal agents were kept secret, and they served BP's interests 
in hampering understanding of the amount of oil leaking (Safina 2011). Chemical 
dispersants are often criticized as a spill-response method. The Alaska Commission 
warned against dispersant use twenty years ago, in favor of surface collection 
technologies such as booms and skimmer craft, which are more effective and less 
destructive to human and environmental health. However, these technologies are more 
expensive to maintain and operate, making them an unlikely choice in a profit-driven 
industry. Dispersants also detract from spill visibility, dispersing oil into billions of 
small, suspended particles well beneath the surface, and reducing the number of images 
of fouled beaches and dying wildlife (Plater 2011). Unfortunately, lack of visibility does 
not mean lack of harm. Dispersing oil downward in the water column increases risk to 
drifting organisms, and dispersants have been implicated as a cause of physical problems 
in humans and non-human animals (Plater 201 0). 
Two studies of enviromnental and human health hazards implemented since the 
Deepwater Horizon spill are of particular interest. The first, a $500 million Gulf of 
Mexico Research Initiative, was implemented by BP to study the environmental and 
public health effects of the spill. The fund will be managed by a board of scientists 
appointed by BP and the Gulf of Mexico Alliance, a partnership ofthe Gulf states (Issues 
in Science & Technology 2010). It will be interesting to compare differences in results 
published by the Gulf Long-term Follow-up Study (GuLF STUDY), which was 
announced by the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS) in 
January 2011. NIEHS is one of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), which is part of 
the Department of Health and Human Services. The GuLF STUDY will include data 
from over 50,000 participants, and aims to assess potential short- and long-term health 
effects associated with Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill clean-up. NIEHS also intends to create a 
resource for collaborative research on specific scientific hypotheses or subgroups. BP is 
not involved in the design, implementation or data analysis of this study. The NIEHS is 
careful to point out the study will provide unbiased and authoritative advice to decision 
makers and the public, and privacy protection for the participants. 
Political and economic influence 
The cost-cutting and risk-downplaying actions that lead to the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill were consequences of the country's insatiable thirst for oil. Agencies 
are often driven by political pressure over public interest. Intense political pressure can 
even cause an agency's personnel who are dedicated to pursuing public interests to 
misinterpret those concerns (Kornfeld 2011). BP may have been particularly prone to 
cutting corners in the Gulf of Mexico, but the comfortable relationships with the MMS 
and its lax oversight are shared by many drilling companies (Plater 2011). 
The wealth oflarge oil companies is almost impossible to conceive. The top five 
oil companies (BP, Chevron, ExxonMobil, Conoco Philips and Shell) made a combined 
profit of $100 billion in 2008 (Flournoy 2011 ). The industry can use this wealth as a 
powerful influence in legislation. In 2010, campaign contributions from the oil and gas 
industries were reported by the Center for Responsive Politics as exceeding $23 million, 
and the oil industry spent over $175 million on lobbying efforts in 2009 (Flournoy 2011). 
Oil and gas industries oppose efforts to reform and strengthen statutes and 
regulating agencies, making it unlikely that Congress or agencies will do more than 
respond to direct and concrete causes of disasters (Flournoy 2011). Under the current 
energy policy, hefty subsidies are offered as an incentive for highly profitable oil and gas 
industries to continue finding and providing oil and more gas. Additionally, a 2005 
Congressional Budget Office Report showed that capital investment tax rates for oil 
extractions are among the lowest rates for any industry (nine percent), and tax deductions 
and credits for the oil extraction industry amount to roughly $4 billion per year (Flournoy 
2011). Louisiana state politicians were elected by oil money, and have defended the 
industry from regulation (including wetland protection), reduced royalties, and given tax 
breaks to that industry (Kornfeld 2011). 
BP has implemented expensive response projects that politicians wanted, but that 
experts criticized as ineffective, ecologically damaging, and a waste of money (Safina 
2011). Scientists, lawyers and the general public have a responsibility to keep the long-
term effects of this tragedy in the public eye before politicians drop the issue in their 
haste to move on to what they deem to be more expedient political concerns (Kornfeld 
20ll). 
Publicity and liability: a conflict of interest 
Controversy, litigation and economic consequences follow environmental disasters; 
and data from research on the health effects of the disaster are used as ammunition in the 
political and social battles that follow (Savitz and Engel 201 0). Soon after the Deepwater 
Horizon spill, tension developed between the desire to fully investigate the health 
consequences of the spill and the desire to provide reassurance that will reinvigorate the 
region's tourism and seafood enterprises (Savitz and Engel2010). 
Some residents, business owners, fishers, environmentalists and the media fueled 
panicky predictions of permanent ruin. Federal agencies lost public trust when some 
officials made hasty assurances not long after the spill that the oil was "gone" (Safina 
2011). Regardless of the nature of reports, the general public has never before been 
exposed to the amount of media coverage of an environmental tragedy, via a multitude of 
mediums and over an extended period of time. News stories, photographs and videos of 
oil-covered wildlife, gushing oil and cleanup crews were published in newspapers, on 
television, and over the Internet (Uhlmann 2011). 
The group of academic scientists that reported the deep-water oil plume arrived in 
the Gulf less than two weeks after the well blew out to inquire what was happening to 
unseen oil and natural gas leaking into mile-deep waters. Research was funded by 
NOAA, which asked for a detailed inventory of all water samples collected, in case of the 
need for evidence in legal proceedings. NOAA worked closely with BP in response 
efforts, but must also lead the environmental assessment that ultimately determines the 
liability ofBP for the spill (Schrope 2010). 
EPA regulation ofBP's response effort required some urgency in answering 
scientific questions regarding hazards of dispersant use, but merging the specifics of 
scientific and legal processes can become complicated. Damage-assessment research as a 
whole was a new experience for many researchers; some claimed, "It's a huge lab 
experiment, but there are no controls." The concept is frightening to scientists who 
usually have a control to measure against (Mascarelli 2010). Also, the NRDA process for 
gathering evidence in spill-liability cases requires restrictions on how samples and data 
are handled, a process foreign to many scientists (Schrope 201 0). 
There were researchers who felt that NOAA's protocol appeared to be an attempt to 
minimize liability on the part of the oil company, and reluctance to admit new assessment 
directions that would make the NRDA process even more complex. Research of new 
issues complicated NOAA's relationship with BP, because assessment studies created the 
potential for liability on BP's part. Researchers pointed out the lack of overall 
coordination of the many types of research being undertaken, which can lead to 
overlooking an issue, or downplaying the risks of another due to complications (Schrope 
201 0). 
Media exposure of mistakes made by the multi-billion-dollar corporation was 
unfavorable for BP. The intense media focus generated a lot of public anger and 
resentment by Americans struggling after a recession (Uhhnann 2011 ). The Deepwater 
Horizon Unified Command said local, state, and federal officials worked together to 
streamline responses of a complex problem to both reporters and the public (Zak 201 0). 
Initially, it appeared that BP and the government were attempting to restrict media 
and public knowledge of the extent of spill damages. Authorities received criticism for a 
series of minor run-ins that gave the impression that BP was calling the shots in media 
coverage. Reporters and photographers claimed that police and federal agencies 
restricted access to public property. One photographer had to wait through 30 minutes of 
phone calls to higher authorities after being stopped by police I 00 yards from the surf, 
only to gain 15 minutes of limited access to photograph an affected beach. In the weeks 
following the spill, BP, the Federal Aviation Administration and the Coast Guard 
restricted access to oil-affected to planes carrying media. 
A lieutenant commander for the Coast Guard stated that neither BP nor the U.S. 
Coast Guard had any rules in place that would prohibit media access to impacted areas. 
Many journalists reported incidents that conflict this statement, but federal authorities 
said they did their best to make it clear that they want to provide access to the story while 
maintaining the proper safety parameters for both cleanup workers and the environment 
itself (Zak 201 0). The Gulf Coast Task Force backs this statement, and said media 
embarks aboard response assets are highly encouraged, to the extent they can be safely 
accommodated. Media access requires proper credentialing, coordination through the 
Unified Area Command Joint Information Center, and following necessary ground rules 
(Restore the Gulf2010b). The consistency of the compliance of federal agencies, BP and 
the media was important to their liability following the spill, in order to avoid misleading 
conduct and violating First Amendment rights (Zak 2010). 
Organizational bias in the media 
The sponsors who promote their agendas to media representatives create news 
jointly with the journalists who decide which stories will be covered, and which sources 
will be interviewed (Widener and Gunter 2007). The complex features of disasters lend 
themselves to multiple interpretations. Depending on their vested interests, claims 
makers may seek to expand or contract the dangers posed by hazardous technologies and 
the damage done by specific disasters (Widener and Gunter 2007). After a disaster, 
researchers often address the "acceptable risks" and systemic features make accidents 
virtually inevitable, as evidenced by research following the Deepwater Horizon spill. In 
contrast, media frames focus more narrowly on the ramifications of a disaster, and go to 
the heart of culpability and compensation issues (Widener and Gunter 2007). 
The story and facts presented in the media are largely determined by the sources 
interviewed, which are most commonly political figures, government representatives, and 
members oflegitimated institutions. Reporters often rely on a "short-list of trusted 
source contacts," who are "articulate and reliable" (Widener and Gunter 2007). 
Presenting multiple sides of a controversial issue allows the media to project an image of 
objectivity, even though all views are not rewarded equal coverage. The media seek 
credible sources, but simultaneously present some sources as more credible than others 
(Widener and Gunter 2007). 
A comparative study between spill coverage in a mainstream newspaper and an 
alternative newspaper in Alaska following the Exxon-Valdez oil spill illustrated the 
sharply contrasting pictures the media can paint. The mainstream paper primarily 
covered only measureable entities such as financial compensation and wildlife. The 
paper also offered a wider range of perspectives, including the differing assessments of 
whether a particular species had or had not recovered. In contrast, the alternative paper 
sought to connect damage with broader themes of respect, duties, and the betrayal of trust 
from the oil industry and the state government to the people of Alaska. When they wrote 
of wildlife losses, they spoke of despair and sadness, not numbers (Widener and Gunter 
2007). The media is a powerful tool in shaping the public's perception of the magnitude 
of a disaster. 
Scientists and the media 
Initially, containment and impact studies focused on surface oil. Media exposure of 
research on a deep oil plume was met by questioning BP executives and spokespersons, 
who argued simply that oil floats (Schrope 2010). NOAA also had a cool response to 
data on the deep-water plumes, calling the research and media reports "misleading, 
premature, and in some cases, inaccurate" (Schrope 2010). 
Unfortunately, most researchers are unprepared for media attention, especially at 
this magnitude. Scientists who acted as the "research face" for the media were 
overwhelmed by interviews for days, weeks, or months. Little media experience, fueled 
by journalists on the hunt for heart-wrenching stories, often led to interview 
misinterpretation. Researchers did what they could to keep records straight and were 
careful to note that more analysis was necessary before confirmation, but they were 
unsure of how else they could have better controlled the picture that the media painted for 
the public (Schrope 2010). 
The media is not solely to blame for dramatization of Deepwater Horizon damage 
reports; some scientists made overstated claims predicting unlikely scenarios, such as a 
thick oil getting entrained in the Loop Current and Gulf Stream and blanketing the east 
coast (Safina 2011 ). However, even the majority of scientists who reported honestly and 
may have been misconstrued do not regret spreading news, because experimental 
opportunities might have been missed if the press had not exposed the data (Schrope 
2010). 
The importance of carefully chosen words quickly became clear to scientists put 
on the spotlight about their data. The scientists were surprised by a statement made by 
NOAA, which said the scientists wished to clarify they had not reached definitive 
conclusions, their findings did not show oxygen levels low enough to be of concern, and 
that connections to subsea-dispersant use was speculative. While scientists fully agreed 
with the statements attributed to them, they had not seen the text before NOAA released 
it. Researchers understood NOAA's need to perform damage control and avoid panic, 
but believed better communication between government agencies and scientists would 
produce more accurate media reports (Schrope 2010). 
In the face of conflicting interests, scientific results will inevitably be seen as 
supportive of one view and counter to another (Savitz and Engel2010). Researchers 
should be aware of this, and ensure that scientific evidence is generated and presented in 
an objective, transparent manner. Funding and oversight of the research should be 
carefully configured, and include the external scientific community and worker advisory 
boards to ensure quality, credibility and acceptability of the findings (Savitz and Engel 
2010). Forums and newsletters allow the general public and affected communities to 
help to direct scientific research, and serve as a point for media contact. 
Conclusions 
It appears that the Deepwater Horizon oil spill unfolded in three parts. First, the 
factors that led to the blowout. Second, the varied responses while oil continued to leak 
from the well. Third, the post-leak period; when assessment, study, and comparison 
merged the technological, political, emotional and scientific components that comprised 
the event (Sarafina 2011). Risk of disaster and conflict of interest are inherent aspects of 
a technologically advanced industry that is driven by politics and economics, and 
governed by wealthy, powerful corporations. Cost- and comer-cutting practices 
undermine the importance of safety. A heavy emphasis on image building and profit-
boosting from the highest levels of authority, reinforced by employee punishment and 
reward, stifled any potential whistleblowing at lower levels (Kurtz 2010). Weak 
governmental regulatory provisions were overpowered by the political and economic 
influence of the oil industry. The advancement and proliferation of contemporary media 
outlets, and their ability to influence public perception, both contributed to and exposed 
internal issues that are innate in the oil-drilling industry. 
These issues demonstrate the need to re-evaluate the planning, regulation, and 
emergency response plans of the oil-drilling industry. Disasters arise from an interaction 
between technological and organizational system failings, and cannot be understood in 
purely technical terms (Flournoy 2011). The natural environment and the organisms that 
utilize an ecosystem - including coastal communities, businesses, and their consumers -
are all irreversibly linked. The loss of one can dramatically affect the sustainability of the 
others; and the recovery of one can influence the restoration of another (Widener and 
Gunter 2007). Environmental catastrophes such as oil spills threaten the integrity of local 
ecosystems, produce concerns about long-term health impacts, involve drawn-out court 
cases, create excessive bureaucratic red tape, and erode communal ties (Widener and 
Gunter 2007). Restoration plans should consider local ecosystems, local people, and 
their history (Kornfeld 2011). Community participation and the exchange of honest, 
objective local knowledge are critical to injury, recovery and transformation assessments. 
Within the oil-drilling industry, a process of continual inquiry and adaptive learning 
should be developed, paired with a culture of effective communication and emphasized 
safety (Flournoy 2011 ). 
On a global scale, enviromnental issues in oil-drilling and other utilitarian 
practices were there before the Deepwater Horizon incident, and remain after. 
Widespread predictions notwithstanding, long-term effects will not be known until the 
long term (Safina 2011 ). The complexity of an ecosystem is simultaneously a weakness 
and a strength; organisms are biologically inclined to adapt, and many scientists agree 
that ecosystems have a remarkable capacity to heal (Mascarelli 2010). Calculating the 
cost of restoration is more efficient than the difficult process of the valuation of nature 
(Nash 2011 ). Most important is determining the appropriate level of restoration, which 
differs depending on whose interest is in mind. There is complexity and imprecision of 
economic models of ecosystem values and services, and their role in conservation policy 
decisions (Nash 2011). 
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill shed light on the need to repair the overall Gulf 
ecosystem, which has lost land area roughly the size of Delaware during the past 50 years 
(Issues in Science and Technoogy 20 I 0). Oil spills seem smaller and fleeting in 
comparison to deforestation, accelerating species loss, freshwater depletion, fisheries 
collapses, human population expansion, polar melting, coral bleaching, and changes to 
the planet's heat balance and the seas' chemistry (Safina 2011). One of the most 
important lessons from the events that caused the blowout is that human judgment is too 
frail and self-filtered to prevent all future accidents associated with deep drilling. Deep 
water accidents are difficult to contain, increasing the stakes to effect natural assets that 
support regional economics, and much stronger government oversight could help (Safina 
2011 ). Because of the inherent risk in deep drilling, internal changes are especially 
needed within oil companies. Oil companies as a whole must not mislead the public 
about protocol before or after a disaster, but accept the responsibility of their mistakes, 
and take the necessary action to repair the damage. 
Each environmental disaster is unique, but they all require identifying health 
consequences, strategies to mitigate them, and lessons for how to do better in future 
emergencies (Savitz and Engel2010). First, it is crucial to anticipate the next possible 
disaster, not merely seek to avoid repeating the most recent one. Second, it is necessary 
to identify not just specific types of disasters that may occur in the future, but the 
blueprint or architecture for this and other similar disasters-the economic, political, and 
regulatory context that facilitated the cascading errors that produced the disaster 
(Flournoy 2011). The general public and media must lobby for the acknowledgment and 
implementation of systematic lessons that have been overlooked in the past (Plater 2011 ). 
Spotting relevant patterns will help to avoid another set of painful and costly mistakes 
(Flournoy 20 II). 
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